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HORRIBLE HOLMES
Mathias Reimann*
L A W W ITHOUT V ALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE
HOLMES. By Albert W. Alschuler. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press. 2000. Pp. x, 326. Cloth, $30; paper, $18.
"More, more, I'm still not satisfied!"1

Holmes has kept scholars busy for most of a century, and the re
sulting volume of literature about him is staggering. In the last twenty
years alone, we have been blessed with four biographies, 2 four sympo
sia,3 three new collections of his works,4 two volumes of essays,5 and
various monographs,6 not to mention a multitude of free-standing law

* Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Dr. iur. utr. 1982, Uni
versity of Freiburg; LL.M. 1983, University of Michigan. - Ed.

1. I thought this quote came from William Shakespeare's Macbeth, but closer scrutiny
revealed that it doesn't. The only source I can cite to is therefore, TOM LEHRER, SMUT
(1965) (no pun intended).

2. GARY J. AICHELE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR.: SOLDIER, SCHOLAR, JUDGE
(1989); LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES (1991); SHELDON NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1989); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF (1993). To be sure, no complete biography of Holmes
existed before 1989. Two of Holmes's official biographers, Felix Frankfurter and Grant Gil
more, never published the fruits of their research (if any); the third completed at least two
volumes, see MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING
YEARS 1841-1870 (1957); MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES:
THE PROVING YEARS 1870-1882 (1963). On Holmes and his biographers, see pp. 31-33. AI
schuler suspects that the failure of the official biography projects was in part due to the frus
tration of the potential authors about Holmes's essentially bleak character. Id.
3. Robert W. Gordon, Holmes' Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 719 (1982); Symposium, The Path of the Law after One Hundred Years, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 989 (1997); Symposium, The Path of the Law JOO Years Later: Holmes's Influence on
Modern Jurisprudence, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1997); Symposium, The Path of the Law To
day, 78 B.U. L. REV. 691 (1998).
4. 1-3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS
AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (Sheldon M. Novick
ed., 1995); THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES,
JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Richard
A. Posner ed., 1992); THE FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: THE MAKING OF AN
AMERICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Frederic R. Kellogg ed., 1984).
5. THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992);
THE PATH OF THE LAW" AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000).

"

6. MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, JUSTICE HOLMES AND NATURAL LAW (1992); H.L.
POHLMANN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE
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review articles.7 Since life is short, everyone who adds to the deluge,
including Albert Alschuler8 with his new book, bears a heavy respon
sibility to make the expenditure of trees, library space, and reading
time worthwhile. Does Law Without Values fulfill that responsibility?
Despite the book's considerable weaknesses the answer is yes, but it is
a close call.
The book presents such a multitude of theses, theories, and ideas
about Holmes, his work, and jurisprudence more generally, it is easy
for the reader to get lost. As best I can see, it basically pursues three
agendas. First, Law Without Values attacks Holmes as a person, judge,
and scholar. While much of Alschuler's critique, depicting the man as
a harsh nihilist and his work as deeply flawed, hits home, most of these
attacks are not new but reiterate existing scholarship. Second,
Alschuler seeks to explain Holmes by looking at him as an existential
ist and positivist. The author's claim that this brings to light the consis
tency between Holmes's character, philosophy, and work is interest
ing, but the attempt to explain away the contradictions and tensions
within Holmes is as time-honored as it is questionable. Third, the book
blames Holmes for having corrupted modern American jurisprudence.
The thesis that Holmes's bleak positivism made a crucial contribution
to the demise of values in modern legal thought is intriguing, but
Alschuler fails to substantiate it.
Alschuler does not clearly define or distinguish between these
three agendas, and he constantly shifts back and forth among them,
often, one suspects, unconsciously. While the execution of all three
agendas leaves something to be desired, the book as a whole conveys
an important message. It illuminates the troublesome implications of a
jurisprudence so skeptical of moral values that it reduces law to its in
strumental function - a jurisprudence shared by Holmes and major
currents of our own age.
At the outset, a note of disclosure is in order. On several occasions,
Alschuler counts me among the Holmes enthusiasts whose (positive)
views he then proceeds to attack.9 I have always considered myself
more critical of, than enthusiastic about, Holmes,10 but I have no ax to
grind and no position to defend. Moreover, I agree with most of
(1984); DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES - HIS THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY
(1995).
7. For a selection of most recent works, see pp. 201-02 n.61.

8. Wilson-Dickinson Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
9. See pp. 10, 200 n.61 (listing my review essay , Why Holmes? 88 MICH. L. REV. 1908
(1990) among the "laudatory " writings on Holmes); pp. 14-15 (counting my characterization
of Holmes as the cultural idol of American law among the "hosannas," p. 16); p. 15 (reading
my characterization of Holmes as having "praised Holmes at length ").
10. While I thus feel somewhat misunderstood as a Holmes fan, I am not claiming that
this is Alschuler's fault rather than my own. On the whole, Alschuler's use of other scholarly
work, including mine, strikes me as balanced and appropriate.
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Alschuler's perceptions of the man and the work, and even with many
of his views on the current state of American legal scholarship, my cri
tique of Law Without Values notwithstanding.
I.

ATTACKING HOLMES

Perhaps the most pervasive theme of Law Without Values is a no
holds-barred attack on Holmes. The book is not a biography but
mostly a long essay in pursuit of Holmes's dark side. In a nutshell, the
critique proceeds as follows.
Holmes, the perceived "hero of American law" (p. 14), subscribed
to a bleak "power-focused philosophy" (pp. 14-30). He was unable to
embrace any substantive values or causes (chillingly, the only cause he
ever believed in as an adult was eugenics). He was neither a utilitarian
nor a true pragmatist but rather an existentialist. Sharing important
characteristics with his contemporary Nietzsche (p. 19), he embraced a
"noble nihilism" (p. 20) and revered "struggle, violence, death, and
the unknown" (p. 29). Personally, Holmes was self-absorbed and indif
ferent to others, ambitious and egotistical (pp. 31-40). He had many
acquaintances, especially among the famous, but few, if any, real
friends. "He lacked (and resisted) familiar forms of love and support"
(p. 40)
witness his professed relief about having remained childless
(pp. 35-36)
and as a human being he was cold, harsh, and lonely.
Both his power-focused philosophy and his personal character traits
largely resulted from his civil war experience (pp. 41-51). Whatever
pre-war beliefs he had held (e.g., in abolitionism) completely collapsed
in the horrors of Balls Bluff, Antietam, and Chancellorsville. Amidst
senseless death and destruction, Holmes lost the ability to believe in
any causes and values - with the exception of the soldier's faith in
blindly throwing away his life. From then on he sneered at human val
ues and considered war the height of human experience.
Holmes's judicial opinions evince his harsh personality and power
focused philosophy (pp. 53-83). His work on the Supreme Court dem
onstrates his inclination to validate the outcomes of power struggles.
His deference to legislative decisions was not an expression of a so
cially progressive attitude but of letting the elected majority have its
way; consequently, he upheld progressive and repressive legislation
alike (p. 63). Thus, Holmes was not at all a great liberal and defender
of individual rights for their own sake. Only late in life, probably un
der the influence of Brandeis, did he veer somewhat in that direction
(pp. 82-83).
Holmes scholarship does not justify his reputation as America's
greatest legal thinker. His book, The Common Law, has mostly been
overrated (pp. 84-131). Its truly remarkable (and well-known) part is
very small - it consists of "five great paragraphs" (p. 85) and these
paragraphs were not nearly as pathbreaking as their reputation sug-

-
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gests (pp. 86-103). The ideas expressed here had long since been de
veloped by others and were widely shared at the time - many of them
even by Holmes's jurisprudential target, Christopher Columbus
Langdell. In fact, the opposition between the formalist Langdell and
anti-formalist Holmes is largely an invention of later generations. The
huge, "mercifully unread" (p. 131) remainder of The Common Law i.e., Holmes's lengthy search for fundamental principles of liability was by and large a scholarly disaster (pp. 104-25). The attempt to dis
till all-encompassing principles from the multitude of cases was a
thoroughly formalist enterprise and worse than anything Langdell
ever attempted. Holmes's arguments and analyses were confused and
contradictory and most of his results implausible, if not patently ab
surd. All in all, the book was a "clear failure."11 Holmes's most famous
essay, The Path of the Law,12 does not fare much better (pp. 133-180).
While the piece has frequently been praised as one of the best essays
ever written about law, closer inspection reveals fundamental flaws.
This is true for all four elements of the "Holmesian positivism" the ar
ticle expresses (p. 133) - i.e., Holmes's prediction theory, his "bad
man" test, his attempt to separate law and morals in general, and his
idiosyncratic theory of contract in particular.13 The whole piece is full
of ill-considered and implausible statements, and Alschuler finds vir
tually nothing to be said in its favor.
Alschuler's explanation of why such a brutalized man holding such
flawed views became the hero of modern American law is threefold
(pp. 181-86). First, Holmes actually had several impressive qualities
(such as brilliance, powerful prose, prestigious pedigree, striking ap
pearance, charm, and longevity), and his views on the crucial constitu
tional issues of the time ultimately carried the day (p. 181). Second,
the promotion of Holmes by Felix Frankfurter, Harold Laski, and

11. P. 125 (citing Saul Touster, Holmes a Hundred Years Ago: The Common Law and
Legal Theory, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 673, 685 (1982)). Holmes's decisions on the Massachu
setts Supreme Judicial Court also show that his thinking about the common law was
"mechanistic, " "undistinguished, " and "at least as callous and pedestrian as those of most
other jurists of his time. " Pp. 130-31.
12. 0.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
13. Holmes's prediction theory "neither corresponds to the ordinary meaning of the
word [Jaw] in our language nor to the meaning of law in our lives. " P. 139. Its focus merely
on courts and merely on sanctions is much too narrow, pp. 145-46, and leaves Jaw devoid of
any substantive content. Pp. 170-71. His "bad man " test misses the mark because a bad man
would worry much Jess about what the courts do than about what those executing their
judgments (i.e., sheriffs) do. P. 145. More importantly, the test is woefully incomplete be
cause people obey legal rules not only for fear of sanctions but also because of their con
science and a "sense of reciprocity. " P. 149. Holmes's crusade against the use of moral ter
minology in law is ultimately pointless because a complete separation of the Is and the
Ought is impossible. "In one sense . . . Jaw plainly is separate from morals, and in another
sense, it plainly is not. Moral sentiments shape Jaw, but law can be immoral. " P. 151. Finally,
his theory of contract as simply an obligation to pay damages for nonperformance is "a
hopeless jumble of ill-considered prescriptive and descriptive ideas. " P. 176.
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other influential disciples created a powerful myth about him to which
he contributed by telling "tales, true and false" (p. 184) about himself.
Third, Holmes formulated and promoted the ideas that came to de
termine the character of twentieth century American jurisprudence.14
What is the reader to make of this diatribe against the most re
vered figure in American law? Alschuler's attack on Holmes is terribly
one-sided, but I do not consider that a flaw. I take it to be Alschuler's
very purpose to present the case against Holmes in order to provide an
antidote to all the lavish praise Holmes has received from others.15 In
current American legal scholarship, deconstruction is a widely re
spected agenda, and "[w]hen you strike at a king, you must kill him."16
Moreover, Alschuler recognizes that Holmes had attractive sides and
emphasizes that the "book does not deny his greatness" (p. 181).
Alschuler just does not make Holmes's positive sides his concern.
The real problem with his attack is that too little of it is new. Any
one who is conversant with the literature about Holmes - and
Alschuler does not seem to write for the uninitiated - will find most
of his points quite familiar. Holmes's nihilist and Darwinian outlook;
his cold and harsh personality; his war experience underlying both
phenomena; the error of reading his Supreme Court opinions as ex
pressions of liberalism; the limited originality of his ideas expressed in
The Common Law; the formalism, confusion, and ultimate failure of
the book; the pedestrian character of his common law decisions; the
fundamental problems with his positivist claims advanced in The Path
of the Law; the creation of the Holmes-myth by his fans and disciples;
and many other aspects, facts, and stories have already been explored
by others and even by Alschuler himself.17 There is no need to support
this statement here, because Alschuler provides all the evidence. He
duly quotes and cites those who have made the respective observa-

14. Pp. 184-86. See infra Part III.

15. On the very first page, the author declares that his book "presents a critical review
of the life and work of Justice Holmes. " P. 1. On several occasions, Alschuler begins his ar
gument by citing those praising Holmes and then proceeds from there. See, e.g., pp. 14-15,
132. My understanding that he purported to write an indictment may be too generous, be
cause in other instances he sounds as if he wanted to engage in a more balanced analysis.
See, e.g., p. 10 ("[T]his book reviews the evidence . . . . ").
16. This was the advice Holmes received from Ralph Waldo Emerson when he showed
him an essay criticizing Plato. The story is well-known and recounted by Alschuler as well.
P. 41.
17. Perhaps the most original part of the book, i.e. the critique of the positivism Holmes
expressed in The Path of the Law, had previously been published as a law review article. See
Albert Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes' Path of the Law One Hundred Years Later,
49 FLA. L. REV. 353 (1997).
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tions and arguments on hundreds of occasions.18 Alschuler is not pla
giarizing, but he is repeating.
Alschuler was apparently conscious of this problem, because he of
fers something of a justification. He considers the more recent litera
ture on Holmes overwhelmingly laudatory and the older, more critical,
views largely forgotten (p. 10), implying that the older views need to
be revisited in order to avoid too rosy a picture of Holmes. Yet, the
recent Holmes scholarship is not overwhelmingly positive (in fact,
most of the older views were).19 Much of it is quite critical 20 or, like the
modern biographies, at least fairly balanced.21Alschuler belies his own
characterization of the modern scholarship because he cites much of it
throughout the book in support of his own highly negative views.
To be sure, Alschuler's critique is not just a mindless collection of
old hats. Some of its elements are new: some of the well-known views
are worked out in greater detail than before, supported by better evi
dence, and expressed more persuasively, and Alschuler assembles the
multitude of prior criticisms in one book. But novelty is the exception;
elaboration does not always lead to new insight, and I wonder whether
the whole of the book's critique really amounts to more than the sum
of its parts.22
Alschuler's bleak personal portrait of Holmes is also quite unsym
pathetic. At least today, we might consider Holmes a victim of war,
haunted by nightmarish images and scarred by extensive emotional
damage. To be sure, it is difficult to feel sorry for someone who had a
brilliant career, succeeded in fulfilling his highest ambitions, and on
the whole appeared to be content rather than tragically unhappy. But
perhaps a lonely and childless man with few, if any, real friends de
serves more pity than condemnation.
Alschuler's attack on Holmes is mainly a collection and elabora
tion of arguments that have been made against Hol�es over the years
with occasional new insights sprinkled throughout. Judged by the
18. See also the collection of critical writings about Holmes by David Dolinko,
Alschuler's "Path," 49 F LA. L. REV. 421, 422 (1997). For a summary of the older literature,
see G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV . 51 (1971).

19. This is particularly true in the early to mid 1930s. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Mr.
Justice Holmes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1279 (1935); Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes, 43
HARV. L. REV. 857 (1930); Frederick Pollock, Mr. Justice Holmes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1277
(1935).
20. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 48-50 (1977); Gordon,
supra note 3; David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44
DUKE L.J. 449 (1994); David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Es
say on Holmes's The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (1997); Touster, supra note
11; Louise Weinberg, Holmes' Failure, 96 MICH . L. REV. 691 (1997). As mentioned, I also do
not consider my own writing about Holmes "laudatory." See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Why
Holmes?, 88 MICH . L. REV. 1908, 1922-24 (1990).
21. See supra note 2.
22. See infra Part IV.
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standards of modern American legal scholarship, which prizes novelty
above almost anything else, 23 this cannot count as a great accomplish
ment. And given the existing mass of Holmes scholarship, one may
doubt whether the book's critique, in and of itself, sufficiently ad
vances our understanding of the man and his work to justify the effort.
Yet, while this critique takes up most of the book's pages, it is only
one of its agendas.
II.

EXPLAINING HOLMES

While much of Alschuler's attack simply purports to demonstrate
that Holmes's greatness was a lot smaller than is commonly believed,
the book also seeks to prove a larger thesis. Looking at Holmes as a
nihilist, Darwinist, and positivist shows that the contradictions and
tensions that many scholars have found in Holmes are more apparent
than real. According to Alschuler, such a perspective reveals that "the
extent to which Holmes's worldview, politics, legal work, and person
ality all matched one another is remarkable. There is a unity to his
epistemology . . . jurisprudence . . . and personal ethics" (p. 11) be
cause a "glorification of war, power, and struggle became the center
piece of Holmes's approach to just about everything" (p. 49).
The thesis is intriguing, and its development in such detail is new.
On the whole, Alschuler's effort to support it is quite successful. Yet, I
wonder whether the endeavor as such makes much sense.
Alschuler's effort succeeds not because he proves his case beyond
a reasonable doubt, but because he makes it plausible enough to merit
careful consideration. Of course, both his overall thesis and most of his
evidence are debatable. The overall thesis that Holmes's harshness,
nihilism, and positivism determined virtually all his adult life and legal
work is open to dispute simply because during his long career, Holmes
did, said, and wrote many things that seem contradictory (and because
personally, he never seems to have been intentionally nasty to any
one). It is no wonder, therefore, that other scholars have proffered
very different explanations of Holmes and have emphasized other fea
tures of his thought.24 Individual pieces of proof are subject to doubt
because much of what Holmes said and wrote was enigmatic and in
vites different readings.25 Thus one can quarrel with many of
Alschuler's interpretations (although most of the responses would re
quire a full-fledged law review article), and some scholars have done

23. Personally, I find this infatuation with novelty at the expense of other values, such as
the integration, orderly presentation, or updating of existing knowledge misguided and silly,
but that is besides the point here.
24. See, e.g., HOFFHEIMER, supra note 6; POHLMAN, supra note 6.
25. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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so with considerable success.26 One can also think of evidence openly
conflicting with Alschuler's thesis but such instances are rare.27 Yet,
ultimately all one can ask of any interpretation of Holmes is that it be
debatable in the positive sense of deserving serious attention.
Alschuler's thesis passes this test with flying colors.
Still, I wonder whether any search for the single key that unlocks
all the mystery in Holmes makes any deeper sense. I doubt it, but not
because such a search is necessarily doomed to failure - it may or
may not be.28 Instead, such an endeavor strikes me as questionable be
cause consistency is not what Holmes himself was all about nor what
makes our engagement with him rewarding. Holmes himself did not
deeply care for consistency, at least most of the time, as Alschuler
demonstrates so vividly with regard to so much of Holmes's scholar
ship.29 He liked to play Mephistopheles,30 i.e., to provoke, dazzle, and
puzzle. He fought the human desire to reconcile all contradictions be
cause he believed that "repose is not the destiny of man,"31 although
he himself often yielded to this temptation. Perhaps even more impor
tantly, the scholarly discussion of Holmes and his work over the past
century has been fueled largely by the perceived contradictions and
tensions in his ideas. He stood at so many crossroads that he wove to
gether a multitude of diverse strands - historicism and modem law
making, formalism and instrumentalism, scholarship and judging, nar
rowminded reasoning and grand ideas, liberalism and totalitarianism,
to name just the obvious. This coexistence of conflicting ideas - not

26. See the responses to an earlier version of one central chapter, Albert Alschuler, The
Descending Trail: Holmes' Path of the Law One Hundred Years Later, 49 FLA. L. REV. 353
(1997), by David Dolinko, Alschuler's "Path, " 49 FLA. L. REV. 421 (1997), and James
Gordley, When Paths Diverge: A Response to Albert Alschuler on Oliver Wendell Holmes, 49
FLA. L. REV. 441 (1997).
27. It may be possible to find consistency even between Holmes's First Amendment
majority opinions and his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624
(1919), a year later, because all of them are ultimately based on deference to the results of
power struggles: the former in the legislature, the latter on the marketplace of ideas. Pp. 7181. But I cannot read Holmes's almost contemporaneous dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918), as the product of a harsh nihilist who believed in and cared about
nothing. It is true that Holmes wanted to defer to the outcome of the legislative process here
as well but he also chastised child labor as an "evil " which all civilized countries have con
demned and he viewed legislative prohibitions as a measure to prevent "ruined lives. " Id. at
280.
28. Of course, every interpretation of Holmes will be somewhat imperfect. On a few
occasions, Alschuler admits as much, most importantly with regard to Holmes's judicial
opinions. See pp. 11, 52-53.
29. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
30. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
291, 295 (1920).
31. Holmes, supra note 12, at 466.
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any kind of real or imagined consistency - is what makes his juris
prudence so intriguing that we cannot let go of him.32
Alschuler is right that it is too simple to divide the phenomenon of
Holmes into "Jekyll Holmes and Hyde Holmes" (p. 15), but it is also
too simple to see, this multifaceted jurist only as an internally coherent
thinker, as "just Holmes" (p. 20). Instead, Holmes's ideas turn out to
be both - contradictory on one level and coherent on another, com
plex in some contexts and simple in others, crystal clear on a few occa
sions and maddeningly vague in most other instances. It all depends
on who looks at these ideas, when, where, and for what purpose. In
this regard, Holmes's thinking was like the law itself. This is why
Holmes is justly considered the law's most prominent symbol in the
United States, and why explaining away his contradictions and ten
sions strikes me as strangely besides the point. Yes, there is the harsh,
nihilist, and positivist Holmes Alschuler portrays, and it is quite plau
sible to see this side of him as internally consistent. But there is also
his tension-ridden alter ego, and on the whole, the contradictory
Holmes is the more interesting, as well as the more significant.
III. BLAMING HOLMES
Alschuler focuses on the coherent - i.e., consistently nihilist and
positivist - Holmes because he casts him as the principal "villain,"
(p. x), in the book's larger morality play. On its stage, Holmes appears
as the leading forerunner of the very skepticism and nihilism Al
schuler deplores in twentieth century jurisprudence. The plot is diffi
cult to follow because the book presents the play in bits and pieces at
its beginning and end (pp. 1-10, 184-186, 187-190) and without regard
to chronological order. The story is roughly this:
The first act describes the early period. Since the time of Socrates
and Cicero and through the age of the great natural law thinkers,
Western culture was committed to substantive ethical values as the
foundation of jurisprudence. In the common law realm, this natural
law tradition was evident in the works of Locke, Blackstone, Jefferson,
Marshall, Kent, Story, etc. (p. 9), and it lasted until the time of the
Civil War. In the second act, beginning in circa 1870, Darwin entered
the stage and, in his wake, positivism and moral skepticism came to
the fore. A revolution occurred during which Holmes, as well as
Langdell, Beale, Pound, and many lesser lights, took over American
jurisprudence. They pushed natural law out of the picture and re
placed it with positivism and value skepticism. They were so success
ful, that, subsequently, "moral relativism [had] its longest sustained
32. Even if Alschuler is right that Holmes's "Nietzschean-Darwinian" worldview can
hold all the parts of The Path of the Law together, p. 135, that hardly means that we will stop
struggling with the essay.
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run in Western history" (p. 19). In the final act, we see how this new
thinking dominates modern American law. Value skepticism appears
in two versions: mild and piquant. The milder version (pp. 2-6) is a
"murky utilitarian pragmatism" (p. 2) that prevails in legal education,
scholarship, and judging. Embracing no substantive ethical principles
of right and wrong, it is consequentialist and instrumentalist, though
ultimately utilitarian. The prime example is law and economics, which,
on Alschuler's stage, is represented by his colleague on the Chicago
faculty, Judge Richard Posner. In the "more piquant" version
(pp. 6-8), value skepticism goes all the way and sees law only as "the
self-interested exercise of power" (p. 2). On the political right, the
main example is public choice theory, on the left, it appears in the garb
of critical legal studies, critical race theory, and feminist jurisprudence.
The overall result is an appalling lack of ethical values in law shared
by the left and right.
To the extent it relates to Holmes, this morality play consists of
three elements: a new and valuable interpretation of Holmes's juris
prudential significance, an interesting but poorly documented thesis
that both the right and left in American jurisprudence are his heirs,
and an amazing claim that following Holmes's path has steered us to
wards the crisis of modern American society at large.
The most valuable aspect is the interpretation of Holmes's role in
the development of American jurisprudence. The book depicts him as
a destroyer not so much of formalism but of the natural law tradition.
It correctly states that in the nineteenth century formalism was not
nearly as prevalent as commonly assumed, and that Holmes's evolu
tionary, policy-oriented, and adaptive view of law was not nearly as
novel (pp. 91-101). According to Alschuler, the crucial change lay
somewhere else: Holmes and those who joined him (including the
"formalist" Langdell) abandoned the idea that jurisprudence must rest
on ethical foundations, i.e., that it must be guided by substantive no
tions of justice. Thus, Holmes's main contribution was not that he
added something to, but that he took something away from, American
legal thought, namely "the sense that law can further objectives be
yond internal coherence, personal tastes, and selfish interests" (p. 10).
In short, "Holmes was at the forefront of a revolution whose achieve
ments were mainly negative. This revolution was not a 'revolt against
formalism' but a revolt against objective concepts of right and wrong
- a revolt against natural law" (p. 10).
Alschuler's new interpretation is both important and convincing.
To be sure, the claim that the revolution Holmes led was not a revolt
against formalism is difficult to defend,33 just as we may doubt the ex-

33. Even Alschuler admits, though just in passing, that Holmes was "a needed corrective
for the mechanistic legal thought of tum-of-the-century America." P. 181.
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tent to which Holmes rejected natural law ideas.34 But we can leave
that to one side. The insight remains that Holmes's agenda was also,
and perhaps even primarily, a revolt against the belief in substantive
values in jurisprudence. This sheds new light on Holmes and on the
changes that occurred in American legal thought after the Civil War.
It also helps us understand the relationship between Holmes and
Langdell (and other formalists), i.e., their shared positivism that dif
fered so markedly from the antebellum period and that became so
dominant from 1870 onward.
Alschuler's thesis that both the right and left in modern American
jurisprudence, especially of the "piquant" variety, are the heirs of
Holmes, is more difficult to assess. To begin with, one must be clear
exactly what he says. His thesis is not that, with Holmes, we have all
become policy-oriented pragmatists and realists; that would be banal.
Instead, Alschuler maintains that we have succumbed to Holmes's re
jection of ultimate truth, to his fundamental value skepticism, and to
his belief that law is merely the result of power struggles. Alschuler
does not claim Holmes as the only cause of this development,35 but he
does see him as the leading figure who sent us down the path toward a
loss of substantive values. This thesis is intriguing, and it is perhaps to
a considerable extent correct. But it is problematic in two respects.
First, Alschuler's claim is questionable because moral elements and
the pursuit of substantive values are not lacking from American law at
large. Just think of antidiscrimination policies and affirmative action,
feminist equality claims or human rights. Or consider the prominent
role of Ronald Dworkin in current American legal philosophy. In fact,
regarding many issues, there may very well be too little, rather than
too much, moral skepticism - witness the morally charged debates
about abortion, gay rights, and the death penalty. Thus, Alschuler's
claim that moral skepticism is rife and exaggerated in modern Ameri
can law is true with regard to some areas, but not across the board.
Second, even with regard to the particular strands of American juris
prudence he has in mind, especially the economic analysis of law and
some radical left-wing agendas, Alschuler fails to substantiate the
connection he sees between Holmes and present-day value skepticism.
One would expect him to demonstrate how, when, and where
Holmes's ideas came to dominate modern American legal thought,
perhaps through Pound or the Realists, but Alschuler does nothing of
that sort. Except for the fact that Richard Posner is a Holmes fan,

34. See HOFFHEIMER, supra note 6 (arguing that Holmes's thought contained significant
natural law elements). Alschuler does not address Hoffheimer's argument but seems to have
overlooked his book.
35. In fact, Alschuler writes that the "revolution " would have happened even without
Holmes. P. 185.
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Alschuler offers no proof that the moral relativism or power-based
views of law in modern jurisprudence are primarily due to Holmes.36
The upshot of Alschuler's morality play is that the value skepticism
we have embraced since Holmes has led to the disintegration of
American society as a whole (pp. 187-90). According to the book, this
society is in a horrible condition. It has the "vices of atomism, aliena
tion, ambivalence, self-centeredness, and vacuity of commitment"
(p. 187), and its members are "indolent, cynical, and bitter - envious
of those above, reproachful of those below, and mistrustful of those
around them" (p. 187). Its evils range from "selfish-consumerism" and
"electronic junk" (p. 188) to crime, child-abuse, guns in school, and
overweight teenagers (pp. 187-89).
All this is true, but one wonders what it has to do with Holmes.
Alschuler himself is not sure. On the one hand, he claims that "[w]e
have walked Holmes's path and have lost our way" (p. 187), on the
other hand he realizes that one "cannot blame teen pregnancies on
Oliver Wendell Holmes" (p. 189). Thus, he vaguely speaks of "affini
ties, symbols, parables, and paradigms" (p. 189). Apparently, the de
plorable state of modern American society isn't really due to Holmes,
although it sort of is. This part of the book does not further our under
standing of Holmes nor, for that matter, of modern jurisprudence. It is
not even a useful educational message. Alschuler wishes to "prompt
some reconsideration of where Holmesian skepticism is likely to lead"
(p. 194), but he fails to show how it leads to doubling homicide rates
(p. 189) or passive and solitary consumption (p. 188), not to mention
"blunt, ugly, angry and dissociative art" (p. 188). Like many doomsay
ers37 and cultural pessimists before him,38 Alschuler apparently be
lieves that America will go to hell in a handbasket unless we forsake
our evil ways and restore morality in society, and he may very well be
right. But his jeremiad is so tenuously connected with Holmes and so
overblown that it provides a sorry finale for the book.
IV. A LAWWITHOUTVALUES
If the reader takes a step back from the particular agendas and
looks at the book as a whole, he or she may note two things. On the

36. Alschuler does hint at a connection between Holmes's bad-man theory, which turns
law "into a system " of prices, p. 174, as well as his theory of contract, and modern economic
analysis of law. Pp. 172-79. But even here, it remains unclear what exactly the connection is.
If the fathers of law and economics, such as Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi, adopted
Holmes's bleak views of life and law, Law Without Values does not tell us when, or how, or
why.
37. Alschuler realizes that his views are "reminiscent of doomsayers since Plato." P. 189.
38. Perhaps the best known modern American examples are ALLAN BLOOM, THE
CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987), and ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD
GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996).

1688

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:1676

one hand, the work lacks internal coherence so that its overall accom
plishment is difficult to assess. On the other hand, Law Without Values
manages to illuminate an important, and disturbing, aspect of modern
legal thought by linking it to Holmes's ideas.
The book lacks a coherent internal structure mainly because it
does not clarify how the various agendas relate to each other. Are they
coequal themes, tacked together because they are, in a sense, all about
Holmes? In that case, we really have three law review articles, mixed
up in a rather jumbled fashion and published in one volume. Or is
there one dominant theme - perhaps Holmes's pernicious influence
on modern legal thought - with the other two assisting in its devel
opment? If so, it remains unclear what, if anything, many of the bits
and pieces contribute to that larger effort. Either Alschuler never
pondered these questions or he simply did not care much about the
answers. Moreover, the flow of the argument is seriously interrupted
by various lengthy discourses that do not really advance any of the
book's principal agendas. These digressions go off on all sorts of tan
gents, from general jurisprudential issues to particular critiques of law
and economics doctrines.39 In and of themselves, many of these mini
essays are extremely perceptive and highly valuable, and it is under
standable that Alschuler could not resist the temptation to include
them. But using a book on Holmes as a launching platform for lengthy
and abstract discussions of the meaning of law or for voicing deep
frustration with modern social decline is distracting and confusing.40
Since Law Without Values fails to integrate its many parts into a co
herent whole, the book remains a loosely organized collection of pro
vocative theses and interesting ideas about Holmes in particular and
American jurisprudence in general. Ironically, Alschuler's work on
Holmes is much like Holmes's work itself - less original than it
seems, rhapsodic, and plagued by digressions but also intriguing, pene-trating, and occasionally brilliant.
39. The clearest illustration of this problem is the lengthy chapter 7 on The Path of the
Law. Pp. 132-80. More than half of it is not about Holmes or his essay at all. Alschuler dis
cusses the relationship between law and morality in the abstract (including the Hart-Fuller
debate), pp. 150-58, pursues such general questions as "Why Define Law?" pp. 158-61, and
"What is Law?" pp. 161-72, and criticizes law and economics, especially the theory of effi
cient breach. Pp. 177-79. Note that these are not minor digressions but major detours which
take up dozens and dozens of pages. At times, Alschuler shows an awareness of the problem
when he admits that the discussion "will carry this chapter some distance from Path of the
Law." P. 161. Still, when he admonishes the reader that "it's about Holmes, remember,"
p. 291 n.159, one is tempted to respond: "No, it isn't."
40. The readability of the book is also impaired by Alschuler's eschewal of footnotes in
favor of endnotes, the consultation of which is notoriously inconvenient. In the case of Law
Without Values, the problem is aggravated by the sheer volume of the notes, which cover
over a hundred pages, pp. 195-306 - more than half as much space as the text. To be sure,
endnotes are not the author's fault, but the terrible habit of most university presses. I suggest
that we reintroduce tarring and feathering as a punishment especially reserved for those re
sponsible for this utter nonsense.
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Despite this lack of integration, and despite its occasional hyper
bole, Law Without Values sheds an interesting, though somewhat dif
fuse, light on modem American jurisprudence: it links the modem
moral skepticism and utilitarian pragmatism to the dark side of
Holmes and thereby elucidates the disturbing implications of these
phenomena. In this context, it does not really matter whether Holmes
is responsible for the current prominence of skepticism and conse
quentialism in American law, or whether these features are in tum re
sponsible for our real or perceived social malaise. Be that as it may,
Alschuler is right that there is an important, and undeniable, affinity
between important elements in modem American legal thought on the
one hand, and Holmes's jurisprudence on the other: sharing a com
mitment to moral skepticism and legal instrumentalism, they both
consider law primarily a result of political struggles and an instrument
of social policy rather than an expression of moral values or a pursuit
of natural justice.41 The harsh and nihilistic Holmes that Alschuler por
trays presents skepticism and consequentialism in extreme form so
that Holmes can help us, as a caricature so to speak, to recognize the
dangers implicit in these attitudes. His jurisprudence shows us how
nicely much of modem mainstream American legal thought jives with
the attitude that might makes right and that the law does not care if
the devil takes the hindmost. In other words, by looking at Holmes, we
can recognize how an infatuation with moral skepticism and with law
as a means of social engineering marginalizes ethical concerns and
comes perilously close to moral indifference, deference to the victors,
and contempt for the losers.
Thus the ultimate importance of the book lies neither in its elabo
rate but largely familiar critique of Holmes, nor in its questionable at
tempt at a consistent interpretation of the man and his work, nor in its
unsubstantiated claim that Holmes is to blame for the status quo of
our jurisprudence and society. Instead, its main importance lies in a
simple but valuable reminder: if American legal culture continues to
revere a Nietzschean nihilist, a power-addicted war enthusiast, and an
emotional cripple without sympathy for the underdog, it is flirting with
moral bankruptcy.

41. Another affinity between Holmes and much, though by no means all, modern legal
scholarship is stylistic. Holmes understood that in order to style yourself as a guru, you have
to sell your ideas appropriately. You have to exaggerate in order to get attention, to simplify
in order to make your ideas attractive to the shallow thinker (as well as easy to remember),
but also to remain sufficiently obscure and contradictory in order to provide a long-term
challenge for the more profound reader. All of these techniques are frequently employed
(consciously or not) by many modern scholars as well, often with amazing success. Since this
style is so obviously at odds with careful scholarship, which calls for moderation, differentia
tion, and clarity, one wonders whether it has become so widely accepted because Holmes
made it respectable. This might be a topic for a study in its own right.

